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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**HOW THE U.S. SQUANDERED ITS CREDIBILITY AND  
HURTS ITS MISSION**

by

Shah Mohammed Nazmul Karim

December 2006

Thesis Advisor:  
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Dorothy Denning  
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**HOW THE U.S. SQUANDERED ITS CREDIBILITY AND HURTS ITS MISSION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Trust plays a vital role in all aspects of life, affecting whether goals are met and the cost of achieving them. It affects and is affected by culture, expectations, and behavior. This thesis examines the nature of trust and its role in military operations and winning “hearts and minds.” It also examines American foreign policy and its relation to trust. Iraq is used as a case study to examine the interaction of U.S. foreign policy and operations with trust and culture. The thesis shows how U.S. policy and actions have undermined trust in the U.S.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After the historical shift of global power from the British empire to the U.S., the United States of America became a real presence in the life of all nations of the world. Technological achievement made that process easier and rapid. Assuming the role of “super power” obligates the United States to maintain stability in other parts of the world. Subsequently, the world experienced a sequence of U.S. interventions; initially in the western hemisphere, later in all other parts of the world, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with all the good intentions of creating a better world, historical records indicate that in many cases U.S. intervention went sour. There has been much thought devoted to reviewing and relearning from those failures. Why did enjoying power and wealth in all aspects not bring success to various U.S. missions? Are there any missing components? In search of answers, this thesis attempts to focus on U.S. foreign policy as it always reflects a set of political goals that outline relational trust with another country. Relational trust is about one party trusting another party, which is based on expectations. This thesis will look for those missing expectations that are perceived as not being met.

Trust remains a very important topic of study in the disciplines of sociology, psychology, political science, economics, and others. Trust, especially when winning “hearts and minds,” is the main factor determining the expense of everything else: time, money and human capital. It is imperative to understand the importance of trust in success of a mission so as to make winning “hearts” and “minds” a natural outcome of a mission rather than an “aim of the campaign.” Trust lies in the social norms of a society; the level and nature or type of trust will also depend on the nature or type of the social norms of that society. Norms are unwritten and often unspoken, yet they govern the normative behavior of a society. They can be felt (if not followed), and frequently experienced in an unfamiliar environment with a different culture. Since norms control behavior, introducing one’s own culture into a new culture often invites cultural



confrontation. But this aspect has not received the attention in military doctrine that it deserves. As a result, the cultural norms of others are often ignored and violated without appreciating the expectation of the one expected to give trust.

Trust is important to the formation of networks. Social scientists always refer to networks of trusted relationships and the resources available through these relationships, whereas military doctrine emphasizes building efficient networks, downplaying the importance of the trusted relationship. The measure of trust is never a simple and standard calculation. An economist may measure in terms of lending money and how much he is getting back from the trustee; skeptical readers may find some gap in surveys as the answers often vary in light of how questions are presented. Trust is intangible and difficult to measure. It can only be felt. In a military mission, feelings may get overridden by aims and objectives of the campaign, feelings of frustration over the resisting forces, a sense of domination and supremacy, etc. These feelings, more often than not, result in actions exactly opposite to those that can help in building trust. For military units, it is essential to remember how the people of other cultures view your actions, not only after, but also before and during the campaign. It has to be remembered that the “occupiers” are the ones who have to gain the trust of the “occupied”; an effort more difficult than rebuilding infrastructure. Hence, in Chapter II this thesis briefly outlines the functions and benefits of trust as well as various levels of trust and the macro societal conditions of a trust culture for better understanding.

In Chapter III, a brief outline is given of U.S. foreign policy, as foreign policy is a reliable indicator of a country’s political vision in establishing relational trust. In respect to U.S. foreign policy, this chapter refers to historian Walter Russell Mead, who provides an overview of American foreign policy that helps others understand the central ideas of the Americans. Mead, in his book *Special Providence* (2002), identifies four broad spectra of U.S. foreign policy by using four great politicians in U.S. history: Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. He then traces how these four general

approaches to U.S. foreign policies have evolved over a period of time. All four broad spectra helped shape and reshape U.S. interests at different stages in the country's development. In this section, the Monroe Doctrine, Chinese Open Door policy, Kyoto protocol issue, Middle East crisis, Global War on Terror, and other examples are discussed. More attention has been directed to Iraq as an example, and a few dimensions are highlighted in search of missing components in winning "hearts and minds." Evidence, documents, and events have been taken from various historical records when investigating why trust in the U.S. might be low in Iraq even before the U.S. invaded in March 2003. There are certain events that come to mind, such as not backing the dissident Shia following Gulf War I, the economic sanctions against Iraq, which hurt the general population, and the bombing of Iraqi civil targets in the name of military targets. After March 2003, there are things like Abu Ghraib and the Hadith incident, failure to stop looting and restore law and order. From another point of view, people in Iraq might have relatively low levels of trust in general that would be projected onto the U.S., aggravated by differences in culture and norms and by the events taking place closely around them. Lastly, though I am not optimistic about various methods to measure trust, I attempted to measure trust by following the Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) method developed by J. Richards Heurer, (1999). It is an eight-step procedure that helps analyze controversial issues.

In Chapter IV, the conclusion and a few recommendations have been offered to help understand the missing components of trust.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The life cycle of living beings is greatly dependent on trust. Even in a jungle, animals know which other animals to trust or not. It becomes even more relevant in the case of humans. Our day to day lives are extremely dependent on others, and thus require a certain level of trust at all times. Depending on how one is brought up in a given environment, each individual tends to have a default level of trust. Even within an environment, each individual, by nature, has his own preset level of trust. Where few start any relationship at 100% trust (later scaling it down depending on good/bad experiences), others may start at 0-% trust; most are in between and raise or lower their innate settings depending on their positive or negative experiences. This kind of “natural” human behavior is shaped by the social norms and culture of a society. It is a pity that the importance of these norms and culture is often neglected without realizing their impact on gaining trust. Trust, especially when winning “hearts and minds” is the deciding factor at the expense of everything else: time, money and human capital. It is imperative to understand the importance of trust in the success of a mission so as to make winning “hearts” and “minds” a natural outcome of a mission rather than simply one more “aim of a campaign.”

After the paradigm shift of global power from the British to the U.S., the United States of America became a real presence in the life of all nations of the world. Technological achievement made that process easier and rapid. Assuming the role of “superpower” obligates the United States to maintain stability in other parts of the world. Subsequently, we experienced a sequence of U.S. interventions initially in the western hemisphere, later in all other parts of the world, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with all the good intentions for a better world, historical records indicate that in many of these cases U.S. intervention went sour. There has been much thought devoted to reviewing and learning from those failures. Why did enjoying power and wealth in all aspects not bring success to various U.S. missions? Are there any missing components? In search of answers, this thesis attempts to focus on U.S. foreign policy, as it

reflects a set of political goals that outline relational trust with other countries. Relational trust is about one party trusting another party, which is based on expectations. This thesis will look for those missing expectations that are perceived as not being met.

This thesis will also highlight specific missions like Iraq in search of missing components in winning “hearts and minds.” Evidence, documents, and events will be taken from various historical records when explaining why trust of the U.S. might have been low in Iraq even before the U.S. invaded in March 2003. There are certain events that come to mind, such as not backing the dissident Shia following Gulf War- I, the economic sanctions against Iraq which hurt the general population, and the bombing of Iraqi civil targets in the name of military targets. After March 2003, there are things like Abu Ghraib, the Hadith incident, and the failure to stop looting and restore law and order. People in Iraq might have relatively low levels of trust in general that would be projected onto the U.S., aggravated by differences in culture and norms and by events taking place.

#### **A. HYPOTHESIS**

In many cases, Americans pay attention to others’ norms and cultures but fail to see or understand. As a result, U.S. policy often ignores the values of others. The U.S. failure in various missions is due to lack of cultural knowledge over a period of time, which needs to be addressed in various U.S. policies and actions. The past failures/lessons learned shape in Americans’ model as they view that in their way. With that point of view, my hypothesis is this that U.S. foreign policy and military doctrine may have fallacies that need to be addressed.

## **II. DISCUSSION ON CREDIBILITY AND TRUST, AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO MISSION SUCCESS DEFINING TRUST**

Trust remains a very important subject in the fields of sociology, psychology, political science, economics and others. The definition and type of trust also varies according to the lens being applied. Social scientist Sztopmka (1999) suggests that trust greatly relates to human actions. To the extent that we cannot predict human action, there is always an associated fear of uncertainty and risk in the future. "Trust is intimately linked with the uncertainty of the future, as long as that uncertainty is of human and not purely natural provenance" (Sztopmka 1999, p. 20). When we cannot overcome uncertainty or risk concerning someone, we in fact experience distrust.

Many social scientists also relate trust to expectation and reciprocity. People will behave in an honest and generous way, expecting that such behavior will be reciprocated. Reciprocal exchange leads to trust: "trust evokes trust."

From the above, we can define trust as an individual's, group's, society's, or nation's reliance or dependence on another person, group, society, or nation under conditions of uncertainty and risk, thus delegating limited power or authority for a positive expectation or reciprocation.

### **A. LEVEL OF TRUST**

Measuring the level of trust remains a challenging job. The following aspects help us estimate the level of trust based on various conditions:

#### **1. Deterrence-Based Trust**

Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin introduced this concept of trust based on assuring consistency of behavior. Here an individual will act out of fear and consequences of punishment for not doing an expected act. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe it as follows:

Like any behavior based on a theory of deterrence, trust is sustained to the degree that the deterrent (punishment) is clear, possible, and likely to occur if the trust is violated. Thus, the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant motivator than the promise of reward (p. 119).

## **2. Calculus - Based Trust**

The above form of trust is also termed calculus-based rather than deterrence-based trust. In the opinion of Lewicki and Bunker, this form of trust is grounded in the fear of punishment for violation as well as in the rewards for keeping it.

Trust is an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 120).

In my opinion, deterrence-based trust is separate and distinct from calculus-based trust as “deterrence”, by definition, leaves no margin for reward. Hence, I will use the term calculus based trust where there is reward and punishment simultaneously.

## **3. Knowledge - Based Trust**

In this form of trust, there is less uncertainty or risk, as the trustee is sufficiently known and his behavior is anticipatable. However, even though known behavior scales down the risk or uncertainty, due to dependence on others, there is still risk. According to Dr. Dorothy Denning (personal communication via email on March 11, 2006),

Humans make mistakes, and circumstances can arise that alter commitments and priorities. People also change, and our knowledge of them is never complete. Obviously, the more you know a person, the more certain you can be of your assessment about their trustworthiness, and so the risk to you is much lower than when you don't have any first-hand knowledge.

## **4. Identification - Based Trust**

This form of trust is usually stronger than knowledge based trust. It comes after interactions and interpersonal transactions, and not before. Here one is so confident that one does not even feel it necessary to monitor others. In this form of trust, one acts as an agent of others, supporting somebody on the basis of something shared like marriage, family, country, city, religion, unit, cause etc. According to Lewicki and Bunker,

A corollary of this 'acting for each other' in identification based trust is that as both knowledge and identification develop, the parties not only know and identify with each other but come to understand what they must do to sustain the other's trust (1996, p. 123).

In another sense, we can describe this as a form of trust where a person places his trust in others instantly without any hesitation due to a shared common identity. Due to interaction over some period of time, this form of trust strengthens knowledge-based trust. Actually, common identity itself leads to resources of knowing each other instantly.

## **B. FACTORS EFFECTING TRUST**

In our daily life, we are interacting with people in different social roles whose action varies according to their positions. Judges, doctors, priests, notaries public, and others generally reflect a trustworthy image, although these images vary across different societies. People also place trust in institutions and organizations like schools, colleges, courts, banks, and military organizations. We often emphasize testimonies and reference to assess the trustworthiness of a person or group. Similarly, people measure trustworthiness through performance, reputation, and appearance. But all these depend on expectation. If expectations are not fulfilled, distrust arises.

In relation to expectation, Sztomka (1999) introduces instrumental, axiological and fiduciary trust based on capability, integrity, and benevolence respectively. Acting reliably, efficiently, morally, and benevolently often reflects trustworthiness. The level of expectation is based on a pre-existent cultural context, underlying the social norms and values in the form of normative rules. These expectations are always associated with relational trust, which is about one party trusting another party. This trust is based on expectations relating to capability, integrity, and benevolence, and is established through appearance, performance, and reputation.

## **C. BENEFITS OF TRUST**

The first and most obvious benefit of trusting is gaining trust in return: "Trust evokes trust". Consequently, it scales down risk and uncertainty. It is also important in the formation of networks. It opens the opportunity for participation in



various local activities and allows interpersonal ties. If anyone wants to build a network, he or she has to somehow build trust. Trust limits exploitation and facilitates exchange. Currently, social scientists use quantifiers to describe trust in terms of transaction costs, as trust reduces monitoring and use of the legal system with its courts and law enforcement. Trust also facilitates cooperation, information sharing, and dealing with crises and conflicts. "High trust of the instrumental, axiological, and fiduciary type seems a prerequisite for battle effectiveness" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 65).

#### **D. TRUSTING IMPULSE**

According to Sztompka (1999, p. 98), various forms of trust - instrumental, axiological, or fiduciary - based on expectation, depend on the trusting impulse. More important to note is that the trusting impulse largely depends on early socialization in the family. Parents' irrational love and care for their children gives birth to the fiduciary type trusting impulse. Later on, axiological expectations develop when children find themselves in friendship circles, games, neighborhoods where there is a question of fair play, keeping promises and secrets, and being loyal. Instrumental type trust is the only form which starts to dominate only with professional life. At all stages, if emerging trust is met consistently, the trusting impulse gradually embeds itself in the personality of an individual; if not, then the trusting impulse will not be able to grow and will remain paralyzed.

#### **E. THE CULTURE OF TRUST**

Sztompka (1999, p. 122) outlines five macro-societal conditions that lead to the culture of trust or distrust:

##### **1. Normative Coherence versus Normative Chaos**

In this form, a set of norms - of law, morality, and customs - provides the basis of social life. These sets of norms make social life secure and unproblematic, orderly, and predictable as they regulate the function of social activity. Here, the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs, law, morality, and customs drive most social activity towards a fixed scenario, influencing what people should and will do. This causes social stability in the society.

Such normative ordering of social life raises the likelihood that other people will meet our expectation. The feeling of existential security and certainty encourages the bets of predictive trust. But apart from that, there are enforceable norms more immediately relevant for trust, demanding honesty, loyalty, and reciprocity. Their presence raises the likelihood of such conduct, and assures us that our bets of entrusting, as well as evocative trust, will also be met; that partners will fulfill obligation, and give us mutual trust (1999, p. 122).

On the other hand, there are always anomalies in social activity which evoke feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. These feelings can lead to withholding trust. "People lose any clear idea of binding obligations, and nobody cares to enforce them. Hence the likelihood of repaid or reciprocated trust collapses" (Sztompka 1999, p. 122).

## **2. Stability of Social Order versus Radical Change**

This macro-societal condition refers to the linked network of groups, associations, institutions, and organizations, which preserve the normal ways of feelings for society, and support and comfort for social life. Under stability, all these features of society remain reasonably constant over time and continually reproduce the system of institutions, customs, and patterns of interaction. "Repeated routines that people follow make it possible to predict their conduct" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 123).

By contrast, under circumstances of radical change, people are faced with new features of social life: groups, associations, institutions, organizations, regimes. As a result, feelings of division, insecurity, and uneasiness arise where the probability of breaching predictive trust is high. It is true that social order is hardly absolute and that change is compatible with trust, "only if it proceeds gradually, regularly, predictably, in a slow rhythm and consistence direction" (Sztompka, 1999, p. 123).

## **3. Transparency versus Pervasive Secrecy**

Transparency refers to openness. Putting this another way, transparency refers to freedom of information, and the availability of information about groups, associations, institutions, organizations, and regimes. Transparency in a social

structure provides the feeling of security and predictability as it leads to participation by all. Here, people try to be more honest if they know that their words will be published. Conversely, secrecy leads to suspicion, rumors, and gossip. In this situation, people hesitate to place trust.

#### **4. Familiarity versus Strangeness of the Environment**

Here Sztompka includes all components of the environment such as landscape, topography, architecture, interiors, designs, colors, taste, smells, images, and so forth as all these elements influence social routine and behavior, thus affecting the building of trust.

[Familiarity] provides one with the feeling of security, certainty, predictability, comfort. In effect, it produces a trust-generating atmosphere, where it is easier to believe that trusting predictions will be born out, that entrusted values will be cared for and returned, and that others will reciprocate with mutual trust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 124).

In contrast, people react with suspicion and distrust when they confront a completely different, strange environment.

#### **5. Accountability versus Arbitrariness and Irresponsibility**

Accountability sets standards, provides checks and balances, and controls conduct, thus diminishing the danger of abuse. This stimulates a more trustful environment. People feel helpless where standards are absent.

The above five macro-societal conditions affect a society's level of trust or distrust. But the result also depends on people's actions and decisions, which are influenced by emotions, thoughts, and behavior patterns that an individual has developed, and personality traits which can vary immensely between individuals. Individuals join in structural opportunities which are open to them through the above mentioned societal conditions, and act as independent variables in a trust culture. Individual participation in macro-societal conditions results in a specific praxis.

There are two types of characteristics that seem to count most for the praxis of trust. There is first a certain personality syndrome correlated with trustfulness. It includes, as most directly relevant, the trusting impulse plus probably such personal traits indirectly

linked with readiness to trust as general activism rather than passivism, optimism rather than pessimism, future orientation rather than a presentist or traditionalist orientation, high aspirations rather than low aspirations, success orientation rather than adaptive orientation, innovative drive rather than conformity proneness. The opposite syndrome seems to contribute to the emergence of a culture of distrust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 125).

Trusting impulse, activism, optimism, future orientation, high aspiration, and success orientation - all these elements form a social mood and either encourage or block the growth of a trust culture. Similarly, wealth, a secure job, plurality of roles, power, education, social networks, robust family, religious beliefs – all these elements defined as collective capital act as insurance and a safety net. As a result, those who are rich in all these components of collective capital place their trust easily. Lack of these elements of collective capital produces insecurity due to the absence of a safety net. Accordingly, social mood and collective capital all together act as mediating variables that affect the trust culture of the society.

#### **F. IMPORTANCE TO MISSION SUCCESS**

Trust plays a vital role in mission success, but grounding trust is also hard to achieve. Previously, we mentioned trustworthiness and efficiency as important factors influencing expectations. We believe that efficiency, capability, integrity and benevolence are all important factors while on a mission as they are expected by all people. But the level and form of expectation varies across cultures. Very often a military unit while on a mission confronts culturally different people and societies. Building trust in a culturally different environment is a very sensitive issue. Each culture has its own manner of interpreting events; the difference between cultural norms is enough to create misunderstanding before one has had a chance to prove one's good will.

Trust lies in the social norms of a society; the level and type of trust will also depend on the type of the social norms of that society. Norms are unwritten and often unspoken, yet they govern the normative behavior of that society. They can be felt (if not followed), and frequently experienced in an unfamiliar environment with a different culture. Norms control behavior; introducing one's

own culture into a new culture often invites cultural confrontation. But this aspect never gets paid attention in military doctrine. As a result we often ignore and violate the cultural norms of others without appreciating the expectations of those we seek trust from.

Trust is important to the formation of networks. Social scientists always refer to networks of trusted relationships and the resources available through these relationships, whereas military doctrine emphasizes building efficient networks, giving the trusted relationship a lower value. A military team, if a part of the occupying force, has to be careful while interacting with civil society as the level of trust is solely based on deterrence and calculus based trust. This level of trust, where there is a threat and a promise, is not always conducive to good relations.

### **III. ASSESSMENT OF U.S. TRUSTWORTHINESS REGARDING RELATIONAL TRUST, INCLUDING SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND REASONS**

#### **A. THE BROAD SPECTRA OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

It was mentioned earlier that foreign policy always reflects a country's political vision in establishing relational trust. Hence, let us focus on U.S. foreign policy to determine whether it has any role in affecting relational trust. We have seen in the previous chapter that this trust is based on expectations relating to benevolence, integrity, and capability; and is established through appearance, performance, and reputation of the person in whom we place our trust. Here, instead of an individual we will consider a sovereign state's performance, appearance, and reputation. In respect to U.S. foreign policy, historian Walter Russell Mead provides an overview of American foreign policy that will help us understand the central ideas of the Americans that have guided American foreign policy. Mead, in his book *Special Providence* (2002), identifies four broad approaches of U.S. foreign policy by concentrating on four great politicians in U.S. history.

Hamiltonian - Alexander Hamilton (January 11, 1757 – July 12, 1804) was a leading American statesman and the first United States Secretary of the Treasury. His view is often termed "American realism." Hamiltonians stress open seas, open markets and emphasize the importance of industry and commerce. Though present day Hamiltonians support free trade, they were in fact very protectionist, favoring New England manufacturers prior to WW II and never supported free trade rights for foreign goods. In brief, Hamiltonian principles are:

- Strong economic foundation backed by strong federal government.
- Freedom of air/sea.
- Free trade and benefits of nation status.
- Taxes to protect U.S. industries.
- "Strategic" material protection.

Wilsonian – Woodrow Wilson (December 28, 1856 – February 3, 1924) was the 28<sup>th</sup> president of the United States (1913 – 1921). His policy came to be the most influential since early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Common principles that are often described as “Wilsonian” includes:

- Advocacy of self-determination by ethnic groups.
- Advocacy of the spread of democracy.
- Anti-isolationism, in favor of intervention to help create peace and/or spread freedom.

Overall, Wilsonian principles are often characterized as being motivated by benevolence and ideology, rather than strict self-interest and fear. Wilsonianism also is equated with idealism. Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. Wilson’s idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the “institution-builders” after World War II. One of the most well-known tenets of modern idealist thinking is the democratic peace theory, which holds that states with similar modes of democratic governance do not fight one another.

Jeffersonian – Thomas Jefferson (April 13, 1743 – July 4, 1826) was the third president of the United States (1801- 1809). Many politicians label him an isolationist as he viewed international objectives as too ambitious and far reaching. He also encouraged the reduction of international commitments. His key views reflect the following:

- Resistant to foreign influence
- Concerned only with the interests of the United States.
- Foreign policy defends American values at home rather than extend them abroad
- Subscribed to egalitarianism

Jacksonian – Andrew Jackson (March 15, 1767 – June 8, 1845) was the 7<sup>th</sup> president of the United States (1829 – 1837). U.S. interests were the core of his foreign policy. He believed that foreign policy existed only to protect American culture, society, and political heritage. He viewed war as a legitimate means to

solve foreign problems where there are no rules for international conflict. This school of thought supports the nation's martial class, where many have been politically strengthened by their war records.

## **B. VARIOUS POLICIES**

In fact, to understand U.S. policy we need to study various policies that were issued during various regimes over a period of time. The Monroe Doctrine, a policy issued by former U.S. President James Monroe on Dec 2, 1823, reflects three major ideas:

- European countries cannot colonize any of North, Central, or South America.
- The U.S. will only be involved in European affairs if America's rights are disturbed.
- The U.S. will consider any attempt at colonization in the western hemisphere a threat to its national security.

If we analyze the key ideas of this doctrine, it is very clear that this policy is designed to oppose European meddling in the western hemisphere and seeks the right of unilateral intervention. Later on, President Theodore Roosevelt added that Latin America was to be considered an area for U.S. commercial interests. Subsequently, we have seen many interventions by the U.S. (Cuba in 1906-1910; Nicaragua in 1909-1911, 1912-1925 and 1926-1933; Haiti in 1915-1934; and the Dominican Republic in 1916-1924). In contrast, in 1898, when the partition of China by the European powers and Japan was imminent, U.S. Secretary of State John Hay, in 1899, sent notes to the major powers of Europe requesting continuation of free use of treaty ports within their spheres of influence in China. In fact, Hay demanded that no nation had the right to exclude other states from trade. Though these two policies – the Open Door policy and the Monroe Doctrine - contradict each other, they served the interest of Hamiltonians as both met U.S. economic interests. One could argue that there is no harm in this, since every sovereign state acts in its own interest. But trustworthiness becomes an issue when you stop the activities of others in the



western hemisphere and seek rights for your activities through an “Open Door” policy elsewhere. Here, people find duality, a double standard logic, and lack of consistency in the present and past policies of a state.

The Monroe Doctrine stopped European power in the western hemisphere and at the same time opened the door to U.S. unilateral rights over the entire western hemisphere. As a result, expansion of territory in the name of Manifest Destiny was easier. The term “Manifest Destiny” is used to express the belief that the U.S. form of democratic freedom would spread across the North American continent. It was first used by Jacksonians in the 1840’s to promote annexation of territory. Though this ideology was used by Jacksonians, the Hamiltonians could also have interpreted it as beneficial, as it gave the American public the ability to acquire natural resources at minimal cost as they established rights to land across America. Manufacturers would not have to pay tariffs on imported resources that were now available within America’s borders. Cheaper resources meant bigger profits for manufacturers.

Not only on the North American continent as we have seen from history, but also in other parts of the world, U.S. leaders (Wilsonians and others) have believed that part of their responsibility has been to spread the U.S. form of democracy and freedom, up until the present day. As a result, it should be very natural that the U.S. would promote strong democratic institutions and practices as well as the active role of civil society in the governance of a state. Unfortunately, over the last few decades, a picture has been painted that as long as the U.S. secures its own interest, all forms of governance, including a military regime, also suit the U.S. The recent military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan could only have survived by satisfying U.S. demands concerning Taliban terrorists. General Musharraf was successful in obtaining F-16 fighters which had been held back for the last fifteen years. This recent behavior takes the global community back to the cold war era when Afghanistan was occupied by the former U.S.S.R. The same cause – securing U.S. interests by undermining the U.S.S.R led the U.S. to build good relations with Pakistan in a military regime led by General Ziaul Haque. After the defeat of the U.S.S.R, it

was unfortunate that Pakistan alone was left to deal with the derailed Mujahideen, whom the U.S. had helped train. This didn't immediately affect the global community beyond Pakistan, but it did send a signal the untrustworthiness of the U.S. due to this dual policy.

Wilsonian lobbies always demand strong action against countries that do things they oppose, like oppress dissidents, permit the genital mutilation of women, and hunt whales in order to uphold moral values. But the global community never heard a single voice from the government about Saudi Arabia, where women are not allowed to drive – the only Muslim country in the world to keep women from doing so. Can we term the Saudi regime as a suitable form of democracy, even better than Iraq's? If the answer is no, then why is the Saudi regime close to the U.S.? Practically, Saudi Arabia's matters are always dealt with by high officials and often by the U.S. president alone (Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, n.d.). This suggests that Saudi Arabia is serving the U.S.'s greater interest, more specifically, oil – the “strategic” material as Hamiltonians would call it.

Despite numerous peace agreements being signed, accords between Israel and the PLO, and innumerable additional efforts, the Palestine resistance is not yet over. Israeli actions against innocent Palestinians and Lebanese, and bombings against the Jewish community prove that a lasting peace in the Middle East is yet to be seen. Most Muslims attribute this situation to America's unilateral economic and military support for Israel, which helped the process easier for Israel to be a nuclear power in that region with the help of France. But there was no criticism as we now hear in the case of Iran or North Korea. At present Israel gets the highest amount of aid from U.S. In 1997, Israel received a total of \$5,525,800,000 in U.S. grants and loans (Washington Report).

Does a good existing GDP and a country roughly the size of the state of New Jersey require that amount of grant aid? It requires it only when a country has to maintain an occupying status. One may argue the fact that Egypt likewise receives a huge amount in grants as a part of the deed to secure peace between Egypt and Israel. Again, many in the Muslim world view this as a part of a bribe

not to oppose Israel. In fact, simply identifying Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations and bombing them doesn't suppress the truth. As Middle East expert Prof Glenn Robinson of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) says, "Simply labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization misses the complex nature of Hamas as a social movement, which has significant theoretical and policy implications" (Lecture on class "Jihad Operations" on Oct 17, 2006). The analysis made by Professor Robinson shows that Hamas shares many of the same features of numerous social movements around the world. Simply labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization doesn't reflect the true scenario that is made up of hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) of Palestinian sympathizers who engage in extensive political and social activities (Hamas as Social, 2004). What we don't understand is that technology can destroy material power but not ideals. Ideals can possibly intervene to some extent with a "Hearts and Minds" policy. The 2006 legislative election in Palestine, in which Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats, proved that it is a social movement. It is to be believed that in the Middle East, U.S. policy will never be viewed optimistically as long as the U.S. maintains such an unbalanced foreign policy about Israel, and Palestine is not changed. It is applicable for Hezbollah too. My comments are further validated by Prof Robinson as he says,

Hezbollah also qualifies as a social movement, quite clearly so. I don't think the label "terrorist organization" is analytically useful and is meant for political purposes. That does not mean that Hezbollah and, even more so, Hamas, do not undertake terrorist acts. They do. But so has every political-military group in history, some more, some less, including those that we revere. (Personal communication through e-mail with Prof. Glenn Robinson on October 17, 2006).

We should look into this matter very seriously because the Organization of Islamic Conference's (OIC) also reflected the same view in a meeting. The meeting held in Malaysia in the first week of April 2002 ended with the following joint declaration:

- The root cause of terrorism includes foreign occupation, injustice and exclusion.
- Reject any attempt to associate Islamic States or Palestinians and Lebanese resistance with terrorism.
- Reject any unilateral action taken against any Islamic country under the pretext of combating international terrorism (“Statement by Minister,” 2002)

The present trend of global terrorism poses the greatest threat to the stability of the world. The 9/11 attack vividly demonstrated the threat of terrorism against security, prosperity, and peaceful development. Many do believe that the threat of indiscriminate violence against the people and governments of the U.S. is a natural outcome of U.S. Middle East policy.

On September 20, 2001, in an address to a joint session of Congress and the American people President Bush declared the national strategy against global terrorism, which resulted in the February 14, 2003 publication of the National Strategy for Combating Terror. Since then, little about this has been changed. The National Strategy for Combating Terror outlines the U.S. government’s strategic intent, objectives and goals. But unfortunately the strategy has not brought the expected results. Rather, over the course of time the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) turned into a “U.S. War on Terror” because means of achieving desired goals were neglected. The National Strategy for Combating Terror as preached has tended to implement ideas by force, while ignoring real facts that might have real consequences for the lives of others. Now, what should be our answer if other states of the world were ask question, “why should we be at your side after 9/11 when we suffered from the same acts of terrorism before 9/11?”

People’s ideas, religions, culture and civilizations are very important concepts to incorporate in the strategy in order to win the “hearts and minds” of the opponent, but, these ideas and views are often neglected by U.S. planners. For example, developing countries are getting a huge amount of counter-terrorism funds to fight this new war. But we all need to supervise those funds to optimize a better output. Bangladesh is one of the countries getting funds to

combat terrorism. Of several hundreds of Madrasas presently under surveillance, many have been forced to close down due to their so-called radical system of education, as viewed by U.S. policy. On October 30, 2006, eighty-two Madrasa students were killed in an air strike in the Bajaur tribal region in Pakistan. Pakistan's military spokesman claimed all of them were militants. But how can it be claimed that the 12 teenagers among the victims were militants? "Like many other residents, Sahibzada Haroon is convinced the seminary was bombed by U.S. drones, and Pakistan owned up to the air strikes up to cover up the whole incident and avoid embarrassment" (Khan, 2006, October 31).

Unfortunately, the [U.S.] Army's experience in war did not prepare it well for counterinsurgency, where the emphasis is on light infantry formations, not heavy divisions; on firepower restraint, not its widespread application; on the resolution of political and social problems within the nation targeted by insurgents, not closing with and destroying the insurgent's field forces (Krepinevinch, Jr., 1986).

In fact, all these actions generate more sympathizers and supporters for radicalism. The "U.S. War on Terror" policy should be funding those madrasas more to obligate them morally to teach the right interpretation of the Quran. But, instead of that, the state entities and ministries assigned this task are buying vehicles, equipment, technology, and creating new government offices, thus producing more bureaucracy similar to the U.S.'s Department of Homeland Security. Many analysts, like Dr. John Arquilla of NPS, view the Office of Homeland Security as just more "bureaucracy." This is the way money is misused, and it may be assumed that the same consequences are taking place in a wide array of countries.

If we change our focus to a different event, we will see another type of destabilizing hazard in the form of global warming which threatens our existence. An amendment was brought to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, known as the Kyoto protocol. This protocol requires a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012. Otherwise, scientists predict that the mean temperature of the earth will be 18 degrees C higher, which will cause

enormous melting from the ice of the Himalayas in South Asia, the Alps in Europe, and the other smaller mountains in other parts of the world. It reveals that with a one meter rise in sea level, more than a third of Shanghai, half of Bangladesh, and the whole Maldives Island would be under water. Australia would face severe drought (Brown, 2001). Holland is already living below sea level, protected by a long 42-foot artificial hill with a 150-foot thick base. As the sea level continues rising due to global warming, the Dutch government is expected to invest an extra U.S. \$10 - \$25 billion in flood and sea defenses (Geographic News, 2001). Scientists strongly believe that the series of wildfires that we are experiencing at present in different parts of the world are the evidence of affected climate (Doyle, 2003). Global warming is a scientific fact which all the nations of the world need to fight together. Upon this realization, one hundred and fifty three countries signed and ratified the Kyoto protocol to combat global warming. Unfortunately, the world's top polluter, the United States, has not yet signed the protocol. How much sense does it make to raise public opinion against whale killing in order to protect the natural balance without signing the Kyoto protocol? The explanations scientists offer for global warming are debatable – but using this as an excuse to delay the on going process of Kyoto could equally be applied to whale killing. This also raises the same question of the U.S. by the affected countries as 9/11 does: “Why should we be at your side after 9/11 when we are suffering due to global warming and you are not at our side?”

Recently signed coercive interrogation legislation by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006 is the latest example of U.S. foreign policy which will create enormous resentment in the rest of the world. Under this law, terror suspects can not challenge their confinement. It undermines the Geneva conventions and reflects the U.S. concept of “might as right” that allows it to do what it wants to do. There is no poll result yet, but can be assumed that it will give birth to resentment among the world community and may be a tipping issue in Iraq and Palestine. Even U.S. citizens demonstrated their anger in front of the White House at the moment of signing. Similarly, when the U.S. Congress

passed the American Service Members' Protection Act (in August 2002) against the position of the International Criminal Court, many wondered what justification the U.S. has to try men under suspicion in its own way?

What the president didn't say is that the abusive interrogation techniques that were the basis for the program are now criminalized. So while in theory he can continue to hold people in secret, he is clearly prohibited from engaging in the types of abuse that seem to be the entire basis and motivation for the program (Jennifer Daskal, n.d).

The cumulative effect of these and other policies depicts a muscular attitude of the U.S. over the rest of the global community. Even so, the U.S. has allies, and many countries do value U.S. power only to accommodate their own interests. Many states keep silent for fear of retribution. This exists as the "Abilene Paradox" among states which will likely be exposed when the overall situation reaches its tipping point. The "Abilene Paradox" is the moment or situation where everyone in a group shares the same feelings but everyone at the same time keeps silent, thinking others don't share their feelings.

With that summary, the overall impression is that U.S. foreign policies do not carry enough positive image to establish sufficiently fruitful, relational trust among other states due to the U.S.'s duality, a tendency to achieve muscular influence in foreign policy and its denial or in some cases its willful ignorance of others' values. The four general approaches to U.S. foreign policy given by Mead persist. U.S. policy makers, have used all four spectra to shape, reshape and fit new policy to what they view as U.S. interests. In fact, to describe it in a theoretical way, American foreign policy's Jacksonian impulse of both deterrence and calculus-based trust are overriding the others due to a lack of axiological and fiduciary components in America's acts and deeds.

Many American politicians will argue that it is not foreign policy but rather the division between "haves" and "have nots" that cause others to not like Americans. These politician groups always point to third world countries as "have nots." But if the division is between "haves" and "have nots", as the country's politicians proclaim and most Americans also believe, why did the U.S. then fail

to obtain UN Security Council authorization for the invasion of Iraq? The U.S. also failed to initiate strong action against Iran. Since France, Russia, UK, Germany are considered “Haves,” then this can not represent a division between “haves” and “have nots”, but rather a race among those in the “haves” group. The issue is then who has relatively more and who has less.

Those who have actually nothing will always tend to inflate the value of intangibles, such as honor, pride, etc. There is in fact no problem about what Americans are, but there are problems about what Americans do, which affects others and often hurts their pride and honor. It is true that the U.S. has done much internationally to help others, such as tsunami relief and earthquake aid in Indonesia and Pakistan respectively. The good impact on people’s thinking about the U.S. depends on the region. If we look at the polls, they show that after the 2005 tsunami the Indonesian people’s opinion about the U.S. moved in a positive direction, whereas even after earthquake aid by the U.S. there was hardly any significant change among Pakistanis. Again, in most cases, this sort of humanitarian aid is viewed as a global political campaign by many, as in the case of the Middle East, where Israeli and American images have become so closely identified that they have become one. As a result, any incidents in the Middle East by Israel are considered to have automatic backing by the U.S.A., rather than suggesting the Middle Eastern countries’ own military incompetence. Among the four spectra, Jeffersonians could probably realize the impact of interventions on others’ honor and pride. American foreign policy should be more Jeffersonian, in line with popular American songs, movies, and American education system which are embraced by all willingly.

### **C. IRAQ: AN EXAMPLE**

Overall, U.S. foreign policy projects an untrustworthy image. As a result, U.S. forces during the initial post re-construction phase in Iraq have had to struggle to change that image. Let us now analyze various events in Iraq, in order to determine how far the U.S. could build relational trust among Iraqis.

The U.S. used Kurds in Iraq much as it used the Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. Historically, Kurds always wanted to separate



from Iraq and become a sovereign nation. After the first Gulf War, Saddam realized this weak link and attempted to build trust with Kurds. The U.S. trust link, however, remained strong with the Kurds. In OIF, the U.S. received good support from those Kurds. The Kurds later got rewarded in terms of investment by foreign companies in their region, and better control over the oil reserves in the Northern Iraq. They also got the opportunity to be more effective in the political setup of Iraq than ever before. Everything seemed to work out well as far as the U.S. overall plan was concerned. Unfortunately, what the U.S. did not realize was that their preset idea of using their trust relation with one faction would make it difficult for them to earn trust with the other factions, i.e., the Sunni and the Shiite.

The Shiites rose from the dead after the U.S.' "shock and awe" campaign settled down. It took them some time to realize that they were Shiites and not Iraqis. Who reminded them of this important fact? It was the U.S. The U.S. was forced to acknowledge the Shiites and their importance for two reasons: First, Shiites were the majority in Iraq and it was important to build trust with them; and second, the Ba'ath party mainly consisted of Sunnis who could not be trusted. Therefore, the U.S.'s pre-OIF trustworthy relationship with the Kurds, the post-Iraq War build-up of trust with the Shiites to shift the power to them, and the constant reminders to Sunnis that you cannot be trusted because you are not Kurd or Shia resulted in distrust amongst various factions of Iraqis. It weakened the already fragile social fabric of Iraq, and strengthened the sub-national identity affiliations of the Iraqis. According to Wadhams and Bergmann, in Iraq there prevailed a "...overwhelming distrust and fear in a deeply polarized society that is also worried about the equitable distribution of power and resources" (2005).

It was hoped that the revival of trust in the U.S. and amongst various factions would occur after the framing of a new Iraqi Constitution. Instead, the new constitution, written under the supervision of the U.S., increased distrust amongst the Iraqis in the following way:

- The parliament was made up of an “artificially constructed collection of ethnic and sectarian voting blocs” (Makiya, 2005). The influential people in the background controlling these blocs were given the power whereas the President and the Prime Minister were kept practically powerless.
- The constitution not only allowed but encouraged the governorships and local administrations to be transformed into independent regions. Except for the Kurds, there were no homogeneous areas. The oil rich regions (mostly with Shiites and Kurds) were given additional benefits whereas the other areas (mostly Sunni dominated) were not given benefits, thus laying grounds for another dispute (Makiya, 2005).

The U.S., in fact, cut the existing coherence among various factions of Iraqis, indeed creating chaos among various sects by reminding them of who is what in terms of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Simultaneously, this sectarian chaos was enough to destabilize the social order. As a result, prevailing sectarian violence gave birth to feelings of division, insecurity of lives and materials, uneasiness, disconformities etc. On the other hand, the U.S. is seen as incompetent in terms of restoring stability to Iraq.

Many scholars argue that there were always identities among various sects in Iraq but that they could not make much out of this under Saddam regime. Saddam did a tremendous amount to create mutual distrust- one of the ways he maintained power. It is true that Saddam was an autocratic ruler and he did oppress many but he did so irrespective of sects even in case of his relatives. During his regime, in fact, he suppressed those he felt threatened him, whether Shitte, Sunni, or Kurds. In fact, Kurds were always isolated by everyone: by Iran, Syria, Turkey, and in Iraq. But when the U.S. realized that Shittes here also a major faction who could take control then they switched to the Shittes. But it was already too. As a result Iraq is now experiencing sectarian violence. But there was no insecurity during Saddam’s regime among the general people as he could maintain national unity. At present there is no national unity among various sects of Iraq due to chaos among the competing groups.

Another important aspect of trust is the difference between the existing strong relationships and the ones that are newly created. Old and strong

relations can survive more than one incident of distrust, but for the newly created relations there is no margin of error. A single failure can bring the relationship back to "square one." Therefore, each member of the military forces becomes important to building trust in post-war reconstruction. Even one failure can bring about unacceptable results. However, it can certainly be argued that it is practically impossible for the commanders to ensure good behavior by all personnel at all times. The unfortunate incidents at Abu Ghraib Prison and the Haditha incident (November 19, 2005) were yet another mistake which undermined relational trust. Here the Americans did not meet trust expectations of Iraqis due to bad behavior. According to Professor John Arquilla, the Abu Ghraib Prison incident may be the single most important failure of the U.S. forces that will cost the U.S. its trustworthiness around the world, and not only in Iraq. This gives many the feeling that other incidents like Abu Gharaib and Haditha are yet to be discovered. Similar offenses such as Marine Private Steven Green killing a whole family on March 12, 2006 after raping a 14 year old Iraqi girl brings such suspicions to mind.

One may argue that these acts were done by a few individuals who do not represent the average military personnel of the U.S. armed forces. But practically, each military person becomes a representative of the whole nation, and an action by one costs the whole nation's image. As a consequence, the U.S. is seen as self-serving and not caring or benevolent towards Iraqis. Any series of incidents like Abu Gharaib, Haditha, teenager rape, killing families, or similar acts will naturally reinforce the belief that the exemption from Iraqi law given to U.S. forces by the UN Security Council encourages further brutal and psychotic acts. It is very natural to build the idea among the Iraqis that local commanders in Iraq have failed to ensure accountability of their soldiers even though they were put on trial.

Iraq is moving towards an American form of government, a federal model which will establish new identities among different sects more deeply; to some extent similar to East and West Germany, North and South Korea, Independent Kashmir and Indian occupied Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab and Indian Punjab. Are

the Iraqis ready for such a new identity and geographical boundaries? Every day there is a rise in the death toll, rapes, lootings, bombings, scarcity of water, electricity, gas etc. All these create a very strange environment and negative image with which Iraqis are not familiar. This unfamiliarity, subsequently, changed Iraqis' social routine such that now they find the landscape, topography, architecture, interiors, smell, taste, and image totally different. As a whole, whatever the pre-existing trust culture was among the Iraqis before the invasion of Iraq, at present, the U.S. is not trusted, as perceived expectations are not being met in the areas of capability, integrity, and benevolence.

#### **D. INTANGIBLES – PERCEIVED BUT NOT MET**

We humans tend to value tangible things and ignore those intangibles, which are mission critical. We cannot see those components, and they vary from culture to culture. We seldom realize that failure to nurture those in order to understand others feelings cost money, time and efforts in tangibles.

My overriding impression was of an Army imbued with an unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination with plenty of talent, and in no way lacking in humanity or compassion. Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head on (Brigadier Foster, 2005).

The above statement is a professional comment by an experienced British senior officer based on his experiences in the Iraq theater. The British general made an attempt to understand the apparently paradoxical currents of strength and weakness witnessed at close hand over the course of a year. It is very difficult to find many facts about what is happening in Iraq even in the era of media freedom. All freedom virtually diminishes in the name of national security. Hence, the observations made by the British general who served at the heart of a U.S. dominated command within the coalition from December 2003 to November 2004 may be taken as a reliable source of evidence from a neutral perspective. He points out many issues that are as follows:

- The U.S. Army acts as **a fuel in a fire**.
- The U.S. Army personnel were **too inclined to consider offensive operations**.
- **Significant events were considered as a minor application of combat power** and were not reported to a four star general by local commander.
- U.S. military were **pre-occupied with the perception that reluctance to use force will boost the insurgents' courage and resilience**.
- U.S. military view **total military destruction of the enemy as a strategic goal for success**.
- At various key decision points, **the U.S. senior chain of command differed from its coalition opinion**.
- U.S. forces **depend heavily on technology** rather than HUMINT thus isolating them from the local population.
- Despite the advantage of having a multi-cultural flavor, the Army was **not culturally attuned** to the environment.
- U.S. forces encourage centralization and discourage low level initiative and innovation. (Brigadier Foster, 2005, emphasis mine.)

The aforesaid British officer's one single comment about dependency on technology rather than HUMINT, in my opinion, is good enough for the locals to think that the U.S. troops are distant. What's more, many houses of Iraqi officers' (who are working closely with the coalition) were searched several times by the U.S. force. Thus, the U.S. force is not only creating isolation from the majority of the civil population but is also (unknowingly) creating feelings of distrust with Iraqi law enforcement agencies and the Iraqi administration. Since trust evokes trust, if the U.S. doesn't trust Iraqi law enforcement agencies, then why should they place their trust in the U.S.?

Brigadier Foster also comments that the U.S. force is not yet trained for unconventional warfare, as its attitude is heavily tuned to wage war with heavy equipment. In unconventional warfare where mass population support is required for winning "hearts and minds," a heavy hand has a negative impact. The British brigadier general's observation is further validated when the modified version of

the U.S. Army Soldier's Creed is studied. This "Creed" is indoctrinated into the minds of all U.S. soldiers:

**Soldier's Creed**

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army values.

I will always place the **mission first**.

I will **never accept defeat**.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient **in my warrior tasks and drills**.

I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand **ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies** of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the **American way of life**.

I am an American Soldier. (The Soldier's Creed, emphasis mine.)

What is disturbing is that even though we intuitively know that gaining trust is very important for an occupying force, we have yet to embrace a universally accepted methodology to measure it. It is more or less evaluated by our perception bias. We often rely upon surveys and poll results to determine how people feel towards an occupying force, but there is little by which to gauge its significance. We often ignore various dimensions of intangible components, which are important in the formation of trust. It is very unfortunate to realize that the "Soldier's Creed" omits intangible components from the U.S. force in respect to unconventional warfare or a post-reconstruction phase.

It was March 22, 2006. International students from the Naval Postgraduate School were in front of Capitol Hill for a programmed visit sponsored by the International Program Office (IPO). Everybody was required to open jackets, belts and, in some cases, shoes, though there were many scanning arches available. Among the students there were whispers heard to the effect that “they should learn courtesy.” The program that is sponsored every quarter by the IPO should build positive views of Americans and their institutions rather than resentment. It is often intangibles that lead people to express the view “they should learn courtesy.” Very minor and silly matters at a vulnerable time can act as a tipping point for grounding relational trust. One can only presume that not enough American commanders in Iraq or the members of Capitol Hill security force appreciate the feelings of pride and honor of being military officer or they wouldn’t inadvertently insult them.

Dr Anna Simons of the United States Naval Postgraduate School points to Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) as an available tool. According to her, “What we mean by EI is information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, and traditional methods of mobilization. Clans, tribes, secret societies, the Hawala system, religious brotherhoods, all represent indigenous or latent forms of social organization available to our adversaries throughout the non-Western, and increasingly the Western world. These create networks that are invisible to us unless we are specifically looking for them; they come in forms with which we are not culturally familiar, and they are impossible to see or monitor, let alone map, without consistent attention and the right training” (Simons and Tucker, 2004). Dr. Simons points out the perfect missing components that are intangible as well as unfamiliar due to cultural difference. But the difficulty is making those intangibles visible in order to penetrate clans, tribes, secret societies, the Hawala system, religious brotherhoods, etc., which largely depend on trust.

In a multicultural environment, we even don’t feel the need to be careful while uttering others’ names. It is very likely that we pronounce Chinese,

Japanese, Russian, or Arabic names incorrectly, because our ears are not tuned to those languages. However, this can be taken as a sign of disrespect in some cultures.

The reliance of the U.S. on technology at the expense of developing greater skills in cross-cultural relations has undermined the development of informal networks. Distinct from other possible meanings of the phrase “informal network,” I am referring to the relationships that build beyond official norms through personal contacts, effort, meetings, email, or other means over a period of time. We should always remember that each individual abroad on a mission or even as a tourist is an ambassador of his country. The relationships that will develop in informal gatherings even on official missions often last forever. Wayne Lacey, a major of the United States Army, once shared a story with me about an experience when he was invited by an Afghan officer named LTC Karim to dine with him.

My next challenge was lunch. As we prepared to dine, [LTC Karim’s] assistant came to wash our hands. Of course LTC Karim was first. I observed his actions and did the right things when it was my turn. I took a similar track through the rest of the meal, simply observing what was going on around me and emulating it as well as I could. LTC Karim commented to me that I looked like I’d been eating with my fingers all my life. - (Personal communication with Maj. Wayne Lacey, student of Naval Postgraduate School, Curriculum 699 on November 11, 2006).

Though his hosts offered Maj. Lacey utensils, he declined to use them. As a result they were amazed to see a westerner eating with his fingers. However, their surprise quickly turned to indifference as they all became just a group of people eating together. According to Maj. Lacey, “the act of dining together brought us closer. My willingness to observe their etiquette made a terrific bonding experience. LTC Karim invited me back to his tent several times, both for casual chat and dining, and later extended an invitation to visit him at his home.” Had Maj. Lacey required utensils, had he refused to sample the various



dishes that were offered, had he not taken advantage of such a great learning opportunity, he would not have been invited back. Maj. Lacey's willingness to step into Afghan culture made him part of an informal network.

It is to be remembered that the occupying force must always rely on locals to navigate the unfamiliar terrain and culture. Money will buy some information but not the most needed. The same information will be sold to various agencies by the agent to gain more money. Often this type of information is a combination of truth and falsehoods to make it partly plausible and partly misleading, whereas information based on trusted relationships will always contain the most accuracy. Many times it happens that an individual might be in a position to influence his country's policy. Informal networks often make the job easier, and will put an individual at the center of friendship networks, whereas formal meetings make the same information more difficult. "One's centrality in the [friendship] network is significantly related to one's power" (Pfeffer, 1992). But Americans tend to ignore establishing relationships with individuals due to the notion that relationships can be established on an as-needed basis.

It is not surprising that in some rural cultures (in Asia and to some extent in Arab region also) a thirsty passerby who asks for water will not be entertained with the glass of water only, but also with some bread or sugar or nuts along with a glass of water. Again, in these same cultures, an individual may find himself insulted if a person known to him does not invite him, as a courtesy, to share his food when they are together. These customs, when followed by culturally different people, often lead them to informal relations and into local networks. Once a person establishes informal relations among the locals, that person will gradually experience that many of his cultural mistakes will be overlooked. On the other hand, if no attempt is made initially, the lack of cultural engagement will give birth to resentment among the locals. Subsequently, a very minor mistake will be magnified and highlighted.

In many cultures (especially in the Arab world), women are still viewed as housewives. In some liberal cultures women are accepted in the working arena, but are yet to be fully embraced in the military discipline. In that type of culture if we ignore local sensibilities and deploy female officers and troops out of liberalism, and openness, our policy will never win the hearts and minds of those people.

It is a very common tendency among South East Asian people to avoid taxes. The government has to make many efforts to elicit a person's actual income, as in many cases transactions occur without any documentation. In these circumstances, in many parts of India, revenue officials recently engaged transsexuals to motivate people to pay taxes. Surprisingly, they collected 400,000 rupees on their first day (India eunuchs turn tax collectors, 2006, November 9). What intangible component acted like magic in this case? In fact, Southeast Asian people believe that transsexuals have supernatural powers. If they are dissatisfied, this may bring disaster to a person or family. The Indian revenue officials cleverly made use of the intangible component of the trusting impulse for their tax collecting mission.

The examples above are but a few of many. These types of intangible components do exist and vary from culture to culture, clan to clan, tribe to tribe.

#### **E. MEASURING TRUST**

Although it is difficult to reliably measure intangibles like levels of trust, one of the better models is the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method developed by J. Richards Huerer (1999). It is a strong tool for analyzing important issues, which require careful weighing of alternative conclusions. It is an eight-step procedure that may be applied to controversial issues. What follows is a brief outline of the steps to be followed:

- Identifying the possible hypothesis to be considered.
- Making a list of significant evidence and arguments for and against each hypothesis.
- Preparing a matrix with each hypothesis across the top and evidence down the side.

- Reconsidering the hypothesis and deleting evidence and arguments that have no diagnostic value.
- Drawing tentative conclusions by trying to disprove the hypothesis against evidence rather than proving it.
- Considering the consequences for analysis if that evidence were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation.
- Discussing the relative likelihood of the entire hypothesis, not just the most likely one.
- Identifying milestones for future observation that may indicate events are taking a different course than expected. (Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Chapter 8)

As illustrated in Table 2, we will also place values of 1 and -1 in the matrix for consistent and inconsistent evidence respectively against each hypothesis. Finally we will accumulate all the inconsistent values (not the consistent ones) downward against each hypothesis. It may be mentioned that before adding down all the inconsistent values, we will multiply each by the corresponding inconsistent weight for credibility and relevance taken from either column I or column II of Table 1. The results in Table 2 use the weights in column I of Table 1.

# Weighted Inconsistency Counting Algorithm

Credibility	Relevance	I	II
H (High)	H (High)	2	4
M (medium)	H (High)	1.414	2.828
L (Low)	H (High)	1	2
H (High)	M (Medium)	1.414	2.828
M (medium)	M (Medium)	1	2
L (Low)	M (Medium)	0.707	1.414
H (High)	L (Low)	1	2
M (medium)	L (Low)	0.705	1.414
L (Low)	L (Low)	0.5	1

Table 1. Weighted Inconsistency Counting Algorithm.

One may use as many hypotheses as desired but here only four are applied to this model. The issue at hand is “Do Iraqis trust the U.S. or not?”

- Hypothesis-1: Iraqis trust U.S., as their expectations are being met.
- Hypothesis-2: Iraqis do not trust U.S., as Iraqi expectations are not met.
- Hypothesis-3: Iraqis trust the U.S., but the situation is not improving due to the U.S. military is not appreciating the allied force.
- Hypothesis-4: Iraqis think that it doesn’t matter whether they trust the U.S. or not, because the U.S. is following its own larger agenda which has nothing to do with Iraqis.

		Source Type	Credibility	Relevance	H-1	H – 2	H-3	H-4
	Weighted Inconsistency score				-9.828	-2.414	-5.828	-9.828
Event	Evidence							
E-1	Restoration of Democracy	open	Medium	High	-1	1	-1	1
E-2	Imposing oil embargo post Desert Storm	open	High	High	-1	1	-1	-1
E-3	Deterioration of Law and Order	open	High	Medium	-1	1	1	-1
E-4	Failure to restore basic amenities	open	Medium	Medium	-1	1	-1	-1
E-5	Abu Gahraib and Haditha incident	open	High	High	-1	1	1	-1
E-6	Switching support from Kurds to Shiites	open	Medium	Medium	-1	1	1	-1
E-7	British Gen. expressed his dissatisfaction for not paying respect to his thoughts	open	Medium	Medium	-1	-1	1	-1
E-8	It was a long dream for Shiites, Kurds and most of the Sunni Iraqis to have freedom from Saddam autocracy	open	Medium	High	1	-1	-1	-1

Table 2. Analysis of Computing Hypothesis.

The above is an outline for the method. The positive or negative value I and II is to be given by individuals depending on the relativity of consistency and inconsistency of events. What appear in this second table are values I have inputted. One can also try this on his own using a software tool that can be found on the web at <http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html>. It is clear that hypothesis-2 has the least inconsistency among the four, and hypothesis-4 is the most inconsistent. As a result, we can conclude that Iraqis do not trust the U.S.

as it is perceived as being unable to fulfill Iraqis' expectations. On the other hand, the level of misunderstanding with the allied force is also negatively affecting trust building.

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## **IV. CONCLUSION**

Do nations with international interests really consider intangibles before implementing a policy or conducting a military mission in a foreign area? According to Dr. Simons (personal communication through e-mail, October 8, 2006), “the U.S. does not currently do an adequate job with ethnographic intelligence – not even when we conduct COIN [counter insurgency].” In such case, we cannot expect success through policies or missions.

Scholars like Sztopka believe that experience influences human behavior as well as expectations. Many social scientists also believe that in the course of time, the social relationship structure (culture, experience) forges our underlying biology and shapes various forms of relational trust: fiduciary, axiological, and instrumental, in the area of benevolence, integrity, and capability respectively. I personally believe that biology determines the basic behavior and expectations of human beings; later, social relationships (which differ from culture to culture) allow the full expression of behavior in various stages of life, and strengthen the notion of humanity largely in terms of trust. In a previous chapter we have also seen Sztopka’s explanation regarding the shaping of the trusting impulse of various stages of life and noted his emphasis on socialization in shaping the trusting impulse.

In many cases Americans do now pay more attention to foreign policies, COIN operations, and post-reconstruction missions but fail to see the real consequences of their actions. The economy plays a great role in shaping a nation’s socio-culture. The economic prosperity that had been envisioned by Alexander Hamilton played a great role in shaping the American socio-culture. A series of successful foreign policies like the Monroe doctrine, Chinese Open Door policy and others made American policy makers optimistic that problems could be solved. This notion gradually embedded itself in the developing national personality as emerging trust was met consistently. As a result, these



consistencies affecting the trusting impulse towards fiduciary and axiological trust were shaped by egoism. Later on, in the military, the “Soldier’s Creed” further validated this egoism.

The achievement of the Americans makes their country a superpower in the world. This hierarchical positioning subsequently enhances egoism, the belief that “might makes right.” All these notions are gradually absorbed into the trusting impulse. As a result, past failures and lessons learned are shaped by Americans’ model as they look through their own lens and bury the intangibles attached to the issues. This develops in the American mind through the socialization process. As mentioned earlier, that socialization process determines the nature of the trusting impulse; thus, various egoism notions are being engrained in Americans during their upbringing when they find their immediate environment is that of a superpower. Again, all these thoughts get institutionalized through bureaucratic and military organizations. To use a common modern image, American culture and personality is the software whereas the bureaucratic military complex is the hardware of the Americans’ trusting impulse. It is just like the software inside the hardware of a PC.

An American, during his upbringing, develops the notion of thinking himself superior to individuals of other nations. With the same thinking, once the American joins a bureaucratic institution and the military, he tends to become even more rigid in his thinking. The bureaucratic structure puts more rules in the way of his trusting impulse, and thus he ends up rejecting any contradiction to “his way” rather than considering the “other’s way.”

“In God We Trust,” a phrase written on the back of a dollar bill, explains the relationship of trust with belief in a seen and certain thing (the dollar bill). Obviously, trust in God means a belief in an unseen and uncertain power. Therefore, trust embeds an element of uncertainty and risk about an unseen future. It is greatly affected by external inputs in terms of knowledge and identity that makes calculation possible and deterrence credible. The measure of trust is never a simple and standard calculation. An economist may measure it in terms

of lending money and how much he is getting back from the trustee; skeptical readers may find some gap in surveys as the answers often vary in light of how questions are presented. In my opinion, “trust” is intangible and difficult to measure. Trust lies in those intangibles that are mentioned in the previous chapter. It can only be felt. On a military mission, feelings may get overridden by the aims and objectives of the campaign, feelings of frustration over the resisting forces, a sense of overwhelming-ness and supremacy etc. These feelings, more often than not, result in actions exactly opposite to those that can help in building trust. For military units, it is essential to remember how the local people view your actions, not only after, but also before and during the campaign. It has to be remembered that the “occupiers” are the one who have to gain the trust of the “occupied”; this is an effort more difficult than rebuilding infrastructure.

#### **A. RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations are made, based on the discussion above:

- American policy should not attempt to put in place the “American way of life” in foreign operations. In fact, it is far better to rally the people by convincing them that their own way of life will be honored instead. This has relevance to the present situation in Iraq. Instead of pushing for the “democratic way of American life,” the U.S. should push for the “Islamic way of democratic life.” The end result may be the same, but the reaction by the people would be different.
- The military officers for post-reconstruction missions must have adequate knowledge of intangible components for a particular culture while dealing with the locals.
- The trusting impulse should be shaped with benevolence and fair activities during the early stages of life.
- It is true that the institutional culture of the U.S. military as laid out in the Soldier’s Creed is helpful in making the soldier devoted to duty. At the same time it is also not very compatible with establishing trust relations. Since trust relations are central to winning “hearts and minds,” the U.S. military force is not well suited to win in the post-war phase.
- A separate force apart from the military should be created just to deal with the post war phase.

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